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Abstract
We build a model where introspection matters – i.e., people rationally form
expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes. Since trustwor-
thy individuals are more “optimistic” about people than opportunists, they are
less afraid to engage in market-based exchanges, where they may be vulnerable
to opportunistic behavior. Within this context, we use an indirect evolutionary
approach to endogenize preferences for trustworthiness. In some cases, the ma-
terial rewards from greater market participation may outweigh the material dis-
advantages from foregoing lucrative expropriation opportunities. This implies
that trustworthiness may be evolutionary stable in the long-term. Although
stricter enforcement (that limits the scope for opportunistic behavior) does in
some cases favor preferences for trustworthy behavior (crowding in) we show
that the opposite (crowding out) may also occur. Our findings are consistent
with recent empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Modern life often requires us to engage with strangers, who may potentially behave
opportunistically. Within this context, the willingness to trust others becomes a pre-
requisite for interaction. The importance of trust for economic exchange is documented
by a recent paper by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007), who show that more trust-
ing individuals are significantly more likely to invest in the stock market, even after
accounting for risk aversion and stock-market optimism. This suggests that an in-
dividual’s willingness to trust others has important consequences for his economic
well-being.
The issue of trust is intimately related with that of intrinsic motivation, or ethical
attitudes within society. When “honest” ethical attitudes are widespread, the risk
of being expropriated is low, even in the absence of explicit enforcement measures
and/or reputation concerns. Hence, trusting others is optimal. By contrast, when
honest ethical attitudes are rare, the risk of being expropriated is high, and trusting
others is no longer optimal.
This paper is concerned with a number of specific questions that arise within this
context. What determines trusting behavior in individuals? What ethical attitudes are
likely to emerge over time? What is the relationship between ethical values and exter-
nal incentives? Although these issues have traditionally been shunned by theoretical
economists, in recent years a growing theoretical literature has emerged. Examples in-
clude Huck (1998), Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bohnet, Huck and Frey (2001), Hauk and
Saez-Marti (2002), Francois and Zabojnik (2005), Corneo and Jeanne (2008), Francois
(2008), Tabellini (2008). Our paper adds to this literature, by providing novel insights
into these questions. While the questions we wish to address are to some extent ap-
plied, our approach is closely related to the game-theoretic literature on the evolution
of preferences, such as Binmore (1994 and 2005), Robson (2001), Samuelson (2004),
Samuelson and Swinkels (2006), Rayo and Becker (2007).
A novel feature of our model is that introspection matters – that is, people form
expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes.1 Psychologists have
long recognized that there is a systematic relationship between people’s own charac-
teristics and their beliefs about the characteristics of others. Starting from the seminal
paper by Ross, Greene and House (1977), a vast psychology literature has emerged on
this subject. Economists have also recently started to pay attention introspection, es-
pecially in relation with trust. A recent experiment by Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales
(2007) suggests that people playing a trust game tend to extrapolate their opponent’s
behavior from their own.
1Introspection also plays a crucial role in Adriani and Sonderegger (2008). However, the focus of
that work is on parents’ incentives to instill pro-social values in their children.
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While the importance of introspection is well established, the implications of this
tendency are more debated. Some psychologists claim that it may induce people to
systematically overestimate the extent to which others are similar to them – indeed,
they refer to it as the “false consensus effect”. Here, we follow Dawes (1989), and
restrict attention to the rational component of introspection.
A detailed description of our model can be found in section 2. We assume that,
although it is common knowledge that an individual may either be opportunistic or
trustworthy, the precise share of each type in the population is unknown. A Bayesian
individual will therefore look at the way she would behave in a certain situation in
order to make predictions about the way her counterparty is likely to behave in the
same situation (i.e., she will use introspection). This implies that individuals are more
likely to engage in market interactions when they are themselves trustworthy. Hence,
introspection generates a selection effect, by making different types of individuals more
or less likely to participate in market interactions. Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2009)
provide experimental evidence indicating that this selection effect is sizeable. More-
over, it persists even when individuals are exposed to (imperfect) information about
the pool of players from which their opponent is drawn.2
A second key feature of our framework is that we let the long-term ethical attitudes
in the population be determined endogenously, as the product of an evolutionary
selection process. In section 3, we characterize the conditions under which preferences
for trustworthy behavior are evolutionary stable and may therefore persist in the long-
run. This may appear surprising at first glance, since trustworthy individuals fail to
expropriate others, even when they could get away with it. However, the selection
effect resulting from introspection affords a potential advantage to the trustworthy,
since they are more likely to engage in market interactions.3 We show that this may in
some cases outweigh the material disadvantages from foregoing lucrative expropriation
opportunities. Hence, it is possible that optimistic, trustworthy individuals may on
average do materially better than pessimistic, opportunistic types. Butler, Giuliano
and Guiso (2009) provide emprical evidence that supports this hypothesis. Their
results show that trustworthy individuals tend to be more trusting. Although these
individuals tend to be cheated more often, they also take fuller advantage of profitable
opportunities. Overall, they find that individuals who do materially better in life also
2Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the same authors also show that trust
(measured on a 0-10 scale by the ESS questionnaire) is highly heterogeneous, even within the same
country. In section 4, we informally discuss how a Bayesian framework may generate asymptotic
differences in individual beliefs. See also Acemoglu et al. (2009) for a formal analysis.
3Orbell and Dawes (1993) first noticed that pro-social individuals had a potential advantage in
the fact that they had more optimistic beliefs and were thus more willing to engage in potentially
beneficial interactions. However they did not consider the evolutionary implications of this advantage.
In other words, the fraction of pro-social individuals is exogenous in their model, while we determine
it endogenously.
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exhibit a positive degree of trust/trustworthiness.
Since trusting behavior pays off only when trustworthy attitudes are sufficiently
widespread, the selection effect favors trustworthy types only when their share in
society is sufficiently large. Hence, our analysis shows that, although the trustworthy
may spread, this may happen only once they have reached a critical mass. The model
may therefore generate multiple evolutionary stable states.
An important insight of our analysis concerns the interaction between ethical atti-
tudes and external enforcement aimed at limiting the scope of opportunistic behavior.
The short-run effect on behavior of introducing external enforcement is analyzed in
section 2.3. In section 3.3, we show that, although strong external enforcement does
in some cases favor the spreading of trustworthy ethical attitudes in the long-run, this
is not always the case. Strong enforcement may “crowd out” trustworthy ethical at-
titudes. As will become clear, this happens because strong enforcement weakens the
selection effect. More generally, our results indicate that the short-run and long-run
effects of different institutional environments may conflict with each other. While
in the short run the distribution of preferences (ethical attitudes) is fixed, in the
longer-term these evolve endogenously, and are therefore affected by the surrounding
institutional environment. We provide an example of how institutional arrangements
that are “good” in the short-term may actually turn out to be “bad” once the endo-
geneity of preferences is taken into account. Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) present
experimental evidence for crowding out. Their paper is further discussed in section 5,
which provides concluding remarks.
The interpretation of our key assumptions, and the robustness of our results to
relaxing these assumptions are discussed in section 4.
2 Introspection and beliefs
The starting point of our analysis is that trusting makes individuals vulnerable to
opportunism. Hence, individuals are willing to take part in market exchanges only if
they believe their counterparty to be trustworthy with a sufficiently high probability.
However, in an anonymous market, access to direct individual-level information about
the trustworthiness of the counterparty may be limited. Introspection – i.e., looking
at the way you would behave in a certain situation in order to make predictions about
the way others are likely to behave in the same situation – may therefore be a useful
source of information.
In what follows, we present a model where beliefs – and introspection – emerge from
standard Bayesian updating. The fact that introspection is important for shaping in-
dividual beliefs is widely acknowledged (see e.g. Singer and Fehr, 2005 and the papers
mentioned in the introduction). Indeed, psychologists even argue that we systemati-
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cally tend to give excessive weight to ourselves when making predictions (the so-called
false consensus effect). Building a model that allows for this may prove impractical,
though. If individuals suffer from a systematic bias when evaluating information, then
they may also suffer from other types of biases or departures from rational decision-
making. For this reason, we present a model that conforms to standard economic
modelling.
2.1 Benchmark model
Principals We consider a trust game where a risk neutral individual (the principal)
must decide whether to participate in an exchange with another individual (the agent)
who may engage in opportunistic behavior. To fix ideas, suppose that the principal is a
buyer and the agent is the seller. The agent can behave opportunistically by delivering
a damaged good or by not delivering at all. If the principal chooses not to participate,
she will save her money, which gives her a material welfare equal to α > 0. If the
principal chooses to trust and the agent behaves honestly, the principal will obtain
θ > α. In contrast, if the agent behaves opportunistically, the principal obtains zero.
Hence, in this latter case, the principal would have been better off not participating in
the exchange at all. We assume away all issues of reputation and concentrate on the
case in which the agent is a complete stranger, randomly drawn from the population,
and the principal-agent interaction is one-shot.
Agents If the principal chooses not to trust, the agent receives a material payoff
equal to zero. If the principal participates, an agent behaving opportunistically obtains
a material payoff of ρ > 0, while an agent behaving honestly receives zero. In the
buyer/seller example, a seller behaving honestly would make no extra profit, while a
seller who, say, refuses to deliver the good, would make a profit equal to ρ. Note that
an individual can benefit from being trusted only if he behaves opportunistically. By
making life as difficult as possible for agents who behave honestly, this assumption
works against the result we want to prove. It is however a good assumption for
expositional purposes, since it allows to abstract from direct rewards from honest
behavior (e.g. reputation, reciprocity, etc.).
We also assume ρ < θ – i.e. engaging in opportunistic behavior is inefficient. In the
buyer/seller example, the buyer may derive higher material welfare from consumption
of the good than the seller, so that more surplus is generated if the good ends up in the
buyer’s hands rather than in those of the seller. As will become clear, this assumption
is necessary for the long-term survival of preferences for trustworthy behavior.
An agent’s material welfare is thus maximized by behaving opportunistically when-
ever possible. On the other hand, opportunistic behavior may entail a psychological
cost for some individuals. More specifically, we assume that all individuals – whether
principals or agents – belong to one of two types: opportunistic (O) and trustworthy
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(T ). Type O individuals only care about material welfare. In contrast with type O,
type T individuals suffer a psychological cost when behaving opportunistically. We
assume that this cost is sufficiently high to ensure that type T always behave honestly.4
Note that although opportunistic behavior may only be undertaken by individuals act-
ing as agents, trustworthiness or opportunism characterize all individuals (including
those acting as principals). Moreover, since opportunistic agents cheat whenever they
can, they are materially better off than trustworthy agents, who never cheat. We refer
to this as the opportunists’ expropriation advantage.
Information A principal is aware that the population from which her agent is
randomly drawn contains both type T and type O individuals. However, the precise
share of type T is not known with certainty. This is a crucial assumption of our model
since it ensures a role for introspection. By looking at her own type, a principal can
gather useful information about the likelihood that her agent is trustworthy.5
We denote with pi the probability that a randomly selected individual in the popu-
lation is of type T (so that 1− pi is the probability of a type O). The principal’s prior
over pi has a non-degenerate cumulative distribution F (pi) and a density f(pi) with
support P ⊆ [0, 1]. In addition to the prior, the principal has two pieces of relevant
information. First, she observes a noisy signal x ∈ X about pi. The signal x is meant
to capture the information that the principal is able to collect about the composition
of the society. This typically reflects past personal experiences and the observed be-
havior of individuals in one’s social network. Conditional on pi, x has density g(x|pi)
and cumulative G(x|pi). We denote with µ(x) the expected value of pi given the prior
F and a realization x, and with σ2(x) the conditional variance.6 We assume that µ(.)
is increasing and that σ2(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. The role of the first assumption is
straightforward, the role of the second is to ensure that no realization of x can perfectly
reveal the true value of pi.
In addition to the signal x, the second piece of information available to a principal
is her own type, τ . Since the principal does not perfectly observe the value of pi, her
type τ can be used to make inferences about the agent’s type. Let the random variable
4This psychological cost may be direct– as a result of the internalization of a “honesty” norm–
or may arise indirectly– e.g., because people may have a preference for keeping their word, as in
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004).
5If the individual were able to perfectly observe the share of trustworthy individuals, her own type
would be irrelevant for her decisions.
6From Bayes’ rule,
µ(x) =
∫
pi∈P
pi
g(x|pi)dF (pi)∫
u∈P g(x|u)dF (u)
(1)
and
σ2(x) =
∫
pi∈P
(pi − µ(x))2 g(x|pi)dF (pi)∫
u∈P g(x|u)dF (u)
. (2)
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τ be equal to 1 if τ = T , and be equal to 0 otherwise. This implies E(τ | pi) = pi, and
V ar(τ | pi) = pi(1− pi). The principal knows that the agent’s type is drawn from the
same distribution from which her own type was drawn. Hence, the probability that
the agent is of type T and the probability that she – the principal – is of type T are
both pi.
2.2 The relationship between trustworthiness and trust, and
the selection effect of introspection
Denote with h(pi|x, τ) the posterior distribution of pi given both x and the principal’s
type τP = O,L. For a type T principal
h(pi|x, τP = T ) = pi g(x|pi)f(pi)∫
u∈P ug(x|u)dF (u)
=
pig˜(pi|x)
µ(x)
(3)
where g˜(pi|x) = g(x|pi)f(pi)/ ∫
u∈P g(x|u)dF (u) is the posterior when observing x but
not τP . Similarly, for a type O principal
h(pi|x, τP = O) = (1− pi) g(x|pi)f(pi)∫
u∈P(1− u)g(x|u)dF (u)
=
(1− pi)g˜(pi|x)
1− µ(x) (4)
The last two expressions show that the principal’s beliefs about pi depend on her own
type. Denoting with G˜ the cumulative distribution associated with g˜, and with τA the
agent’s type, a type T principal believes that the agent is a type T with probability
Pr(τA = T |x, τP = T ) =
∫
pi∈P pi
2dG˜(pi|x)
µ(x)
= µ(x) +
σ2(x)
µ(x)
(5)
The same probability for a type O principal is
Pr(τA = T |x, τP = O) =
∫
pi∈P pi(1− pi)dG˜(pi|x)
1− µ(x) = µ(x)−
σ2(x)
1− µ(x) (6)
Given a value of x, the principal believes the agent to be trustworthy with higher
probability when she is herself a trustworthy type. Individuals thus project their own
characteristics onto others.
Given (5) and (6), the expected net payoff U from participating for a type T
principal is
E(U |x, τP = T ) =
(
µ(x) +
σ2(x)
µ(x)
)
θ − α (7)
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The equivalent for a type O is
E(U |x, τP = O) =
(
µ(x)− σ
2(x)
1− µ(x)
)
θ − α (8)
The difference in expected net payoffs between a type T and a type O principals
can then be written as
E(U |x, τP = T )− E(U |x, τP = O) = θ σ
2(x)
µ(x)(1− µ(x)) > 0 (9)
which is always positive. Hence, keeping everything else equal, trustworthy individuals
are always (weakly) more willing to take part in market exchanges that opportunists.
We call this the selection effect of introspection. Proposition 1 summarizes the results
so far.
Proposition 1. (Selection effect) Given the same realization of the signal x: (i) a
trustworthy principal believes the agent to be trustworthy with a higher probability than
an opportunistic principal (i.e., she “trusts” more) and (ii) a trustworthy principal ex-
pects a higher material (net) payoff from participating than an opportunistic principal.
Proposition 1 shows that, provided σ2(x) > 0, different types of individuals hold
different beliefs about the trustworthiness of others. The differences in the two types’
beliefs is proportional to σ2(x)/ [µ(x)(1− µ(x))]. To interpret this ratio, note that the
numerator is a measure of the accuracy of the signal x. The denominator is equal to
V ar(τ |x) and is therefore a measure of the accuracy of the signal τ .7 Overall, a small
value for the ratio indicates that introspection is a relatively poor signal of pi. Hence,
the beliefs about the agent’s trustworthiness held by a principal of type T should not
be much more optimistic than those of a type O. By contrast, a large value for the
ratio suggests that introspection is a relatively accurate signal. As a result, the beliefs
of a principal of type T should be much more optimistic than those of a type O.
Our model thus predicts that differences in trusting attitudes may translate into
different attitudes towards market participation. Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2009)
and Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales, (2007) provide experimental evidence indicating
that trustworthy individuals are significantly more trusting. The first of these studies
7Applying the law of total variance,
V ar(τ | x) = E (V ar(τ | pi) | x) + V ar(E(τ | pi) | x) (10)
Straightforward calculations show that the first term in (10) can be written as
E (V ar(τ | pi) | x) = µ(x)(1− µ(x))− σ2(x). (11)
Moreover, since E(τ | pi) = pi, the second term in (10) is equal to σ2 (x).
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also analyzes the relationship between trust and economic performance, using data at
the individual level. The evidence suggests that more trustworthy individuals tend
to be cheated more often. On the other hand, less trustworthy individuals – who are
accordingly less trusting – tend to miss too many profit opportunities.8
2.3 Enforcement
We now extend the benchmark case to allow for exernal enforcement (enforcement in
short). Enforcement acts as a limitation to the agent’s ability to cheat the princi-
pal: an agent behaving opportunistically is able to expropriate the principal only with
probability 1 − φ. More precisely, suppose that the specific circumstances that char-
acterize a principal-agent interaction are drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
With enforcement φ, in all circumstances belonging to the interval [0, φ] opportunistic
behavior would be detected, and the agent would be punished. We assume that the
agent’s payoff when punished is strictly lower than his payoff when acting honestly.
This ensures that, whenever the specific circumstances surrounding the principal-agent
interaction fall in [0, φ], behaving opportunistically is strictly dominated independently
of the agent’s type. A type O agent will therefore be willing to engage in opportunis-
tic behavior only when the circumstances surrounding the interaction belong to (φ, 1].
From an ex-ante perspective, this happens with probability 1−φ.9 In the buyer/seller
example, a buyer matched with a type O seller is thus able to obtain the good with
probability φ. The case where φ = 0 corresponds to the scenario of null enforcement
analyzed above. When φ ≥ α/θ, it is dominant to trust independently of the agent’s
type. Hence, the distribution of types within society is irrelevant for participation de-
cisions. To make the problem relevant, we thus assume φ ∈ [0, α/θ) in the remainder
of the paper.10
Given φ, the expected net payoff for a type T principal is
E(U |x, τP = T ) =
(
µ(x) +
σ2(x)
µ(x)
)
θ(1− φ) + θφ− α (12)
8The correlation between trustworthiness and trust is so strong that researchers find it hard to
empirically identify the two variables. For instance, Glaeser et al. (2000) show that the answer
to the World Value Survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or you can’t be too careful when dealing with people?” is a better predictor of an individual’s
trustworthiness, rather than of his/her trusting behavior.
9Our approach shares similarities with Tabellini (2008), where the quality of external enforcement
is modelled by the probability of detection.
10We model enforcement with the exogenous parameter φ. Alternatively, one could view enforce-
ment as a variable that is set by policy makers. So long as the policy makers’ information consists
in publicly available information, the analysis would be equivalent. If the policy maker possessed
private information, then issues of signaling would arise. We leave this case to future research.
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The equivalent for type O is
E(U |x, τP = O) =
(
µ(x)− σ
2(x)
1− µ(x)
)
θ(1− φ) + θφ− α (13)
From expressions (12) and (13), the expected net payoff from trusting is increasing
in φ.11 As one would expect, higher enforcement gives more incentive to participate to
the principal. In what follows, the effect of an increase in enforcement on the difference
between the net payoff expected by a type T and by a type O will play a crucial role.
This difference is
E(U |x, τP = T )− E(U |x, τP = O) = (1− φ)θ σ
2(x)
µ(x)(1− µ(x)) > 0 (14)
Notice that, relative to (9), an increase in φ reduces the difference in expected net
payoffs. The next proposition summarizes the effects of external enforcement.
Proposition 2. (Effects of external enforcement) Given a realization of the signal x,
an increase in external enforcement (φ): (i) increases the expected net payoff from
trusting for both types, (ii) reduces the difference between the net payoff expected by a
trustworthy principal and the net payoff expected by an opportunistic principal.
The intuition for point (i) is straightforward. The intuition for point (ii) is that,
as enforcement increases, the agent’s type becomes less important for the decision of
whether to participate – since a principal may obtain the good with a positive prob-
ability even if she has the misfortune of being paired with an opportunistic agent.
This has little effect on a trustworthy principal’s incentives, since her attitude is a
trusting attitude to start with. By contrast, the effect on opportunistic principals is
much larger. With null enforcement, opportunistic principals are very reluctant to
participate, since they tend to project their own (opportunistic) type onto their agent.
Overall, therefore, higher enforcement boosts the expected payoff of an opportunis-
tic principal more than it boosts that of a trustworthy principal. This weakens the
selection effect.
To sum up, in this section we have accomplished two purposes. First, we have
shown that different types of principals may rationally have different trusting attitudes
– and may therefore be more or less inclined to participate as a result. Second, we have
shown that introducing external enforcement boosts both types’ expected net payoff
from participation, although the effect is stronger for the opportunists. As a result of
this latter effect, higher enforcement weakens the selection effect of introspection.
11The terms µ(x) + σ
2(x)
µ(x) and µ(x) − σ
2(x)
1−µ(x) represent the probabilities that a type T and a type
O respectively attach to the agent being of type T . As a result, they are always less than one.
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3 The evolution of trust and ethical attitudes
Point (i) in proposition 2 suggests that higher enforcement increases the expected
return for both opportunistic and trustworthy types from participating in market in-
teractions. Keeping everything else constant, this should then translate into higher
participation. There is, however, a caveat. Although in the short-run keeping the
distribution of types within the population fixed may be appropriate, this is not the
case if we consider a longer horizon. In the longer-run, the distribution of types within
the populations is determined endogenously, as a result of a transmission process that
may be affected by institutions. A full understanding of the relationship between
institutions and individual behavior should take the long-term endogeneity of prefer-
ences into account. This is what we do in this section. We endogenize the share pi
of trustworthy and analyze the long run equilibria of the model. Our aim is that of
characterizing the conditions under which the trustworthy can survive a process of
natural (or, more to the point, cultural) selection in the long run, and whether this
may depend on the level of enforcement.
At present, there is no universally accepted model of cultural evolution – indeed,
in the words of Bowles (1998), “We know surprising little about how we come to have
the preferences we do.” For this reason, we abstract from a detailed analysis of the
process of cultural transmission of traits, and instead adopt a reduced-form approach
that borrows from evolutionary biology and evolutionary game theory. Differently
from most evolutionary game theory, we do not analyze the evolution of behavior,
but we consider rational behavior given the preferences and the beliefs associated
(via introspection) with the preferences. This is essentially the indirect evolutionary
approach pioneered by Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) and Gu¨th (1995).12
3.1 Extended model
We start by adding some structure to the simple model presented in the previous
section. We assume that there is a continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of individuals. Individuals
are either of type T or of type O and are identical in all other dimensions. Each
individual is simultaneously involved in two interactions with two strangers (with
whom she is randomly matched). In the first interaction, she acts as a principal and
chooses whether to take part or not in an exchange. In the second interaction she
takes the role of agent and chooses to behave honestly or opportunistically if trusted
12See also Bester and Gu¨th (1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Samuelson (2004), and Samuelson
and Swinkels (2006). Note that this approach (and in particular the replicator dynamic presented
below) is consistent with a number of possible “micro-foundations”, including Bisin’s and Verdier’s
(2001) model of cultural transmission (see also Francois, 2008, for further details).
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by the principal.13 Information structure and payoffs are the same as in the previous
section. Each individual i observes her own type and the (idiosyncratic) signal xi ∈ X.
Both the type and the realization of xi are private information. Consistent with the
evolutionary literature, we will interpret material payoffs as “fitness” in the rest of the
paper.
3.2 Relative fitness and evolutionary stability
LetXτ ⊆ X denote the set of signal realizations for which type τ chooses to participate.
More precisely, XT is the set of realizations of x such that (12) is positive, while XO
is the set such that (13) is positive. An individual i of type τ observing xi ∈ Xτ
will participate and obtain θ with probability pi + (1 − pi)φ and zero otherwise. The
same individual observing xi /∈ Xτ will choose not to participate and will obtain α
for sure. Consider now the payoffs that individuals obtain as agents. While type T
individuals make zero profits, type O obtain ρ with probability 1 − φ, provided that
they are matched with a principal who chooses to participate. Given the fraction of
type T individuals in the population pi, this happens with probability
pi
∫
x∈XT
dG(x|pi) + (1− pi)
∫
x∈XO
dG(x|pi), (15)
where
∫
x∈Xτ dG(x|pi) is the fraction of type τ individuals who choose to participate.
We can then write the difference between type T ’s and type O’s average payoff as a
function of the actual share of trustworthy individuals in the population,
Ω(pi;φ) =
(∫
x∈XT
dG(x|pi)−
∫
x∈XO
dG(x|pi)
)
(piθ + (1− pi)φθ − α)− (16)(
pi
∫
x∈XT
dG(x|pi) + (1− pi)
∫
x∈XO
dG(x|pi)
)
ρ(1− φ).
The first line of (16) is the difference in average material payoffs between trustworthy
and opportunistic individuals in their role of principals. The second line represents
the difference in their role of agents. Borrowing a term from evolutionary biology, we
say that the quantity Ω(pi;φ) represents the relative fitness of type T given pi. This
is used below to characterize the evolutionary properties of different distributions of
types in the population.
13This is meant to capture the notion that, in life, people are often simultaneously involved in a
number of interactions, where they may play different roles. For instance, when someone buys a new
house he his simultaneously a seller (for the old house) and a buyer (for the new house). Alternatively,
we could have assumed that before exchange occurs, individuals are randomly selected to play the
principal or the agent role, with probability 1/2 each.
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As shown by (16), the level of enforcement affects relative fitness both directly and
indirectly. On the one hand, it lowers the probability that a principal is cheated by her
agent. On the other hand, it may alter the individuals’ propensity to participate. The
latter effect emerges because different degrees of enforcement change the expected
payoff from participation. This may affect XT and XO. If participation decisions
are identical – namely, XT = XO 6= ∅ – then the first term in (16) is zero. In
this case, relative fitness is always negative, owing to the opportunists’ expropriation
advantage. However, participation decisions need not be the same. From Proposition
1 we know that introspection makes trustworthy individuals more likely to participate.
The selection effect thus implies that XO ⊆ XT . As a result, if pi is sufficiently large
so that
θ(pi + (1− pi)φ) > α (17)
then the first term of (16) is (weakly) positive. This is important, since it implies
that if their share in the population is sufficiently high, the trustworthy may do better
than the opportunists as principals. As a result, when pi sufficiently high, the sign of
Ω(pi;φ) is not necessarily negative. [Indeed, in the next section we show that it can be
positive.] By contrast, if the share of trustworthy in the population is so low that (17)
does not hold, then opportunists do (weakly) better than trustworthy as principals,
since they are less likely to participate. This is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. (Relative fitness) From a material viewpoint, type O individuals al-
ways do strictly better than type T as agents. As principals, type O do (weakly) better
(so that Ω(pi;φ) < 0) for pi sufficiently low. By converse, for pi sufficiently high, type
T individuals do (weakly) better, so that the sign of Ω(pi;φ) is ambiguous.
Proposition 3 suggests that there are complementarities in trustworthiness, in the
sense that being trustworthy rather than opportunist is more profitable when the
trustworthy are majoritarian. In a way, trustworthy individuals “create their own
space”.14 Intuitively, when their share in the population is low, the selection effect
actually hurts trustworthy individuals, since trust is clearly misplaced. Things change
when the share of trustworthy in the population is high. In this case, the advantage
that trustworthy principals derive from the selection effect may overcome the oppor-
tunists’ expropriation advantage as agents. There are two opposing forces at play. On
the one hand, since the trustworthy are more likely to participate, the presence of
many trustworthy individuals favors opportunistic agents, who are more likely to find
gullible “victims”.15 On the other hand, the presence of many trustworthy individuals
14The expression is borrowed from De Long et al. (1990). They show that noise traders with an op-
timistic bias may obtain higher expected returns than rational arbitrageurs when enough individuals
share the same bias. The mechanism behind of our effect is quite different, though.
15Given XO ⊆ XT , the second term in (16) is weakly increasing in pi.
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also increases the returns from participation – since the chances of meeting an oppor-
tunistic agent are remote. For relative fitness to be positive, the return from trusting
an agent who behaves honestly (namely, θ) must be sufficiently high relative to the
material payoff from opportunistic behavior (namely, ρ).
Evolutionary stability The equilibrium concept we use is that of evolutionary
stability, first introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). A trait τ = T,O is
evolutionary stable if a population composed of individuals with the same trait τ can-
not be successfully invaded by an alternative trait τ ′ 6= τ that is initially rare. Hence,
a state where all individuals are trustworthy (opportunists) is evolutionary stable if
the average fitness obtained by trustworthy (opportunistic) individuals in this state
exceeds that of the opportunists (trustworthy). Formally, for  > 0 vanishingly small,
pi∗ = 1 and pi∗ = 0 are evolutionary stable states if Ω(1 − ;φ) > 0 and Ω(;φ) < 0,
respectively. In some cases, the evolutionary process may not lead to homogeneous
populations, but to a mixed population in which both type T and type O individ-
uals coexist. We then say that pi∗ ∈ (0, 1) is a (mixed) evolutionary stable state if
Ω(pi∗;φ) = 0 and |pi=pi∗dΩ/dpi < 0. These conditions are equivalent to requiring that
pi∗ is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamic (see Bowles, 2006, p. 72)
pi′ − pi = pi(1− pi)βΩ(pi;φ) (18)
where pi is the share of type T individuals in the current generation, pi′ is the share of
type T in the next generation. The parameter β > 0 captures the speed with which
the trait with higher fitness spreads among the population.16
Having introduced the notion of evolutionary stability within our framework, the
next step is to characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria. Unfortunately, a full
characterization of relative fitness in our framework is not possible without additional
assumptions on the shape of the signal distribution, G. Inspection of (5) and (6)
shows that expected payoffs are not necessarily monotonic in the realization of the
signal x. While this is interesting from a theoretical viewpoint, it complicates the
task of determining the sets XT and XO. For this reason, in what follows we restrict
attention to the simple case of a binary signal, which guarantees monotonicity.
3.3 The binary signal case
Assume that X = {0, 1} and that g(x = 1|pi) = pi (so that g(x = 0|pi) = 1 − pi).
In words, the probability of receiving the high signal (x = 1) when a fraction pi of
16The basic idea underlying the replicator dynamic is that individuals in the new generation tend
to inherit the trait of their parents. However, a fraction of individuals in each generation will be
exposed to “cultural models” different from their parents and may thus change their types. The
probability of switching depends on the relative fitness, so that switching from type O to type T is
more likely when Ω(pi;φ) > 0, while the reverse happens when Ω(pi;φ) < 0.
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individuals are of type T is equal to pi. Symmetrically, the probability of receiving the
low signal (x = 0) is 1− pi. Denote also with Πn ≡ E(pin) the n-th moment about the
origin of F (pi). We assume that the prior F (pi) does not change over time.17 Given
the information structure, the conditional expectation of pi given x ∈ {0, 1} is
µ(1) =
Π2
Π1
, µ(0) =
Π1 − Π2
1− Π1 (19)
while the conditional variance is
σ2(1) =
Π1Π3 − Π22
Π21
, σ2(0) =
Π2(1− Π2)− Π3(1− Π1) + Π1Π2 − Π21
(1− Π1)2 . (20)
Before stating the result, it is necessary to impose a weak requirement on the prior
distribution F (pi). In Section 2, we assumed that the conditional variance σ2(x) was
positive for all x. Given the conditional distribution of x, this has implication for the
shape of the prior F (pi). The next assumption ensures that we restrict attention to
priors that do not violate σ2(x) > 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}.
Assumption 1. The prior F (pi) is such that a) Π1Π3 −Π22 > 0 and b) Π2(1−Π2)−
Π3(1− Π1) + Π2Π1 − Π21 > 0.
Assumption 1 is satisfied for a broad class of priors, such as for instance the uniform
distribution (0, 1) and, more generally, the whole class of Beta distributions. A full
discussion of the technical implications of Assumption 1 is postponed to the next
section. Given Assumption 1, it is immediate to verify that
R2 ≡ Π3
Π2
> R1 ≡ Π2 − Π3
Π1 − Π2 > R0 ≡
Π1 − 2Π2 +Π3
1− 2Π1 +Π2 (21)
where R0, R1, and R2 are obtained from (5) and (6). In particular, R2 is the probability
assessment that the agent is of type T made by a type T principal observing x = 1.
R1 is the same for a type T principal observing x = 0. The probability assessment
of a type O who observes x = 1 is also equal to R1. This is not surprising once we
consider the fact that the conditional distribution of x|pi is identical to the distribution
of τ |pi. Intuitively, the information of a type O who observes x = 1 is equivalent to the
information of a type T who observes x = 0. Finally, R0 is the probability assessment of
a type O principal observing x = 0. Overall, therefore, (21) implies that an individual
observing x = 1 expects the agent to be trustworthy with strictly higher probability
than an individual observing x = 0. Moreover, given the same realization of x, a type
T principal expects her agent to be trustworthy with strictly higher probability than
a type O principal.
17Expectations are nonetheless affected by the dynamics of pi through the idnividual signals x and
τ .
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From equations (12) and (13), a principal with assessment Rk, k = 0, 1, 2, will
participate if18
Rkθ(1− φ) + θφ− α ≥ 0 (22)
or
Rk ≥ α− θφ
θ(1− φ) ≡ R(φ). (23)
In words, for a given level of enforcement φ, a principal who believes that a ran-
domly drawn agent is trustworthy with probability R(φ) would just be indifferent
between participating or not. Note that R(φ) is strictly decreasing in φ and ranges
between α/θ (when φ = 0) and 0 (when φ = α/θ).
The relationship between R(φ) and R0, R1 and R2 determines the participation of
the different types. In turn, this affects relative fitness, and determines which states
may emerge in the long-run. For instance, if R(φ) > R2 then no individual (trustwor-
thy or opportunistic) participates, independently of her signal’s realization. Hence,
XT = XO = ∅, and relative fitness Ω(pi;φ) is equal to zero for all pi. In this case,
there is no evolutionary stable state, but all pi ∈ [0, 1] are neutrally stable.19 By con-
trast, if R(φ) ≤ R0, then all individuals (trustworthy and opportunistic) participate,
independently of the signal received. In this case, XT = XO = X. As a result, rela-
tive fitness Ω(pi;φ) is strictly negative for all pi, so that pi = 0 is the only evolutionary
stable state. This situation generally arises when enforcement is sufficiently high to
ensure that even the least trusting individuals in society (i.e., opportunists observing
x = 0) choose to participate. Things become more complex when R(φ) takes interme-
diate values, i.e. it is located in the interval (R0, R2]. The next proposition provides
a characterization of the evolutionary stable states in that case.
Proposition 4. (Evolutionary stable states) Suppose that R(φ) ∈ (R0, R2].
1. If R(φ) ≥ (θ − ρ)/θ, then pi = 0 is the only evolutionary stable state.
2. If R(φ) < (θ − ρ)/θ and
(a) R(φ) ≤ R1, then pi = 0 is evolutionary stable, but there may also exist (for
parameters values) a mixed evolutionary stable state.
(b) R(φ) > R1, then pi = 1 and pi = 0 are both evolutionary stable (in fact, they
are the only evolutionary stable states). The basin of attraction of pi = 1 is
(θR(φ)/(θ − ρ), 1).
18We adopt the convention that individuals participate when indifferent.
19Intuitively, while in the presence of a small shock pi does not revert to its previous level, it does
not move further away from it either.
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Proof. See Appendix.
As proposition 4 highlights, a situation in which all individuals are of type T is
evolutionary stable when the minimum probability that makes a principal willing to
participate, R(φ), is less than (θ− ρ)/θ and greater than R1. The first requirement is
necessary to generate complementarities in trustworthy ethical attitudes. For comple-
mentarities to emerge, the presence of a large share of trustworthy individuals in the
population should benefit the trustworthy more than the opportunists. The benefit
that the opportunists derive when there are many trustworthy about is that they are
more likely to find gullible “victims” to expropriate. The benefit that the trustworthy
derive from the presence of a large share of trustworthy is that expropriation is less
likely. When R(φ) < (θ − ρ)/θ, the first effect is weaker than the second, since the
material benefits generated through the selection effect outweigh those generated by
the expropriation advantage.20
The second requirement deals with participation. If R(φ) ≤ R1, then even the
opportunists tend to participate when the share of trustworthy is large. As a result,
the selection effect has little bite.
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which both requirements are met.21 When R1 <
R(φ), the individuals who actually choose to participate are those that are trustworthy
and that also have favorable information (x = 1). An opportunist would therefore not
participate, even if she observed x = 1. If the material benefits generated by the
selection effect are sufficiently large (R(φ) < (θ − ρ)/θ), then, for pi close to one, the
opportunists achieve lower fitness than the trustworthy. Notice that in the equilibrium
with pi = 1 everyone participates (since the population is only composed of type T
and all observe x = 1). The amount of investment is thus the maximum possible.
Figure 2 considers the case where R(φ) is greater than or equal to (θ− ρ)/θ. Here,
the advantage afforded to type T through the selection effect is too small to overcome
the opportunists’ expropriation advantage. Hence, type T have lower fitness for all
values of pi. The unique evolutionary stable state is then pi = 0. In this equilibrium,
the population is totally composed of opportunists and all observe x = 0. Notice that,
so long as R(φ) > R0 an opportunist observing x = 0 would not participate. As a
result, the aggregate level of participation in the pi = 0 equilibrium is zero.
Finally, Figure 3 deals with the case in which R(φ) is lower than (θ − ρ)/θ, but it
is also lower than R1. Since R(φ) ≤ R1, an opportunist who has observed x = 1 would
participate. Here, pi = 0 is evolutionary stable, while pi = 1 is unstable. However, a
20The requirement R(φ) < (θ − ρ)/θ can equivalently be written as θ − α > ρ(1 − φ). The lhs
captures the net gains from participation when pi = 1 (the selection effect). The rhs captures the
(expected) gains that can be reaped by opportunistic agents (the expropriation advantage).
21The Figure is based on a uniformly distributed prior. Parameters are as follows: θ = 1.5, α = 1,
ρ = 0.4, φ = 0.2.
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total takeover by type O is not the only possible outcome. For parameter values, there
may exist a mixed evolutionary stable state. This is the case shown in Figure 3.22 In
the pi = 1 equilibrium, overall participation is zero. In the mixed equilibrium, partici-
pation is partial, since opportunists observing x = 0 do not participate. Notice that,
in this equilibrium, information effects prevent either type from spreading all the way.
For instance, a marginal decrease in pi would make x = 1 signals correspondingly less
common. This would decrease participation by opportunists (but not by trustworthy),
increasing relative fitness of type T . Similarly, a marginal increase in pi would increase
the opportunists’ participation, which would lower relative fitness.
To sum up, when R(φ) takes intermediate values, a population composed only
of opportunists is always evolutionary stable. However, other outcomes are possible.
There are three alternative scenarios. In the first, a population of opportunistic in-
dividuals is the unique stable state. In the second, a population entirely composed
of trustworthy individuals is also evolutionary stable. If this is the outcome, all in-
dividuals participate. In the third scenario, the trustworthy never completely take
over, although the population may settle in a mixed evolutionary stable state in which
trustworthy and opportunists coexist.
Comparative Statics The conditions laid out in proposition 4 show that a
necessary requirement for trustworthy attitudes to persist in the long-term is that the
expropriation advantage enjoyed by opportunists should be lower than the material
advantage that arises from greater market participation. Formally, this implies R(φ) <
(θ − ρ)/θ. Since R(φ) is increasing in α, a higher α makes the condition harder to
satisfy. This is because a higher α increases the material payoff that can be reaped
without participating to the market, which lowers the material advantage generated
from the selection effect. Similarly, a higher ρ also makes the condition harder to
satisfy, since it raises the expropriation advantage. Third, a higher value of θ increases
the benefits reaped from the selection effect and therefore makes the condition easier
to satisfy.
Finally, note that R(φ) is decreasing in φ. Changing the level of enforcement φ
affects relative fitness in two ways. First, keeping participation behavior constant, a
higher φ lowers the opportunists’ expropriation advantage, and therefore raises rela-
tive fitness. Second, a higher φ lowers the risk of expropriation and therefore makes
participation by opportunists more likely. This is the binary-signal equivalent of point
(ii) in proposition 2.
External enforcement and ethical attitudes: crowding in and crowding
out We now look more closely at the relationship between external enforcement and
22The Figure is based on φ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.1. Everything else is as in Figure 1.
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ethical attitudes, by providing some formal results. Since the results are essentially
implications of Proposition 4, they are presented as Corollaries.
Corollary 1a) (Crowding in) Consider two enforcement levels φ′ and φ′′ > φ′.
Then, pi = 1 is evolutionary stable under φ′′ but not under φ′ if
R2 ≥ R(φ′′) > R1, (24)
and either i) R(φ′) < (θ − ρ)/θ and R(φ′) > R2 or ii) R(φ′) ≥ (θ − ρ)/θ > R(φ′′).
Corollary 1b) (Crowding in) Consider two enforcement levels φ′ and φ′′ > φ′. If
both R(φ′) and R(φ′′) are such that pi = 1 is evolutionary stable, then the equilibrium
with pi = 1 has a larger basin of attraction under φ′′ than under φ′.
Corollaries 1a) and 1b) illustrate how higher enforcement may actually crowd in
trustworthy preferences in the long-run. This can happen in two ways. First, as shown
in Corollary 1a), higher enforcement can make sure that opportunists cannot prosper
in a society composed only of trustworthy. There are two types of situations where
this may occur. One is where the selection effect would actually generate sufficiently
high gains, but prior beliefs are too pessimistic for a selection effect to arise. Given
the pessimistic prior, with low enforcement the trustworthy would not participate,
even after observing the high signal. In this case, a moderate increase in enforcement
would induce trustworthy individuals with favorable information to participate, hence
generating a selection effect. This is case (i) in the corollary. Case (ii) arises when
the selection effect is actually quite weak. This may for instance occur when the
social gains generated by honest behavior by the agent (θ− ρ) are small, or when the
payoff that a principal may obtain by not participating (α) is large. In this case, the
selection effect may outweigh the opportunists’ expropriation advantage only when
enforcement exceeds some minimum threshold level. Hence, an increase in φ may
induce convergence to the “good” equilibrium where all individuals are trustworthy.
Second, as shown in Corollary 1b), when both pi = 0 and pi = 1 are evolutionary
stable, higher enforcement may expand the basin of attraction of the good equilibrium.
An example is illustrated in Figure 4.23 When enforcement is low (φ = φ′), the basin
of attraction of the equilibrium with pi = 1 is (pi′, 1). By converse, when enforcement
is high (φ = φ′′), the basin of attraction is (pi′′, 1).24 If the initial pi lies between pi′′
and pi′, then, in the presence of low enforcement, pi would over time converge to zero.
In this case, a timely increase in φ (from φ′ to φ′′) may reverse the dynamics inducing
convergence to the good equilibrium.
These results are broadly in line with the general idea of complementarity between
institutions and social capital. However, greater external enforcement may also have
unintended consequences in the long run. This is formalized below.
23In the Figure, φ′ = 0.2 and φ′′ = 0.3. Everything else is as in Figure 1.
24From Proposition 4, pi′ = θR(φ′)/(θ − ρ) and pi′′ = θR(φ′′)/(θ − ρ).
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Corollary 2 (Crowding out) Consider two enforcement levels φ′ and φ′′ > φ′. If
R(φ′) < (θ − ρ)/θ, and
R2 ≥ R(φ′) > R1 ≥ R(φ′′) > R0, (25)
then pi = 1 is evolutionary stable under φ′ but not under φ′′. As a result, the long run
level of participation may be lower under φ′′than under φ′.
Higher enforcement may thus lead to an equilibrium with worse preferences – what
we call crowding out. As a result of crowding out, overall participation may also
fall. The effect behind crowding out is similar to that highlighted in Corollary 1a),
but in reverse. Intuitively, with low enforcement (φ = φ′), only the trustworthy who
observe the high signal realization choose to participate.25 If society is composed
primarily of trustworthy people, then participating pays off, and the trustworthy may
actually end up materially better off than opportunists. By contrast, if enforcement
is high (φ = φ′′), then opportunistic individuals observing the high signal also start to
participate.26 This eliminates the selection effect, since, when pi = 1, an opportunistic
“mutant” is as likely to participate as a trustworthy individual. The state pi = 1 is
therefore no longer evolutionary stable.
Since the equilibrium with pi = 1 is characterized by the maximum level of par-
ticipation, participation can only fall. If the fourth inequality in (25) holds – so that
opportunists observing the low signal never invest – we can then have two scenarios.27
In the first, the population converges to an equilibrium population comprising only
opportunists. In this case, market participation collapses to zero. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.28 The second scenario arises when there is a mixed evolutionary stable
state that prevents pi from dropping to zero. In this state there is a positive share of
opportunists observing the low signal who do not participate. Hence, despite a pos-
itive level of participation in equilibrium, participation is below the level achievable
when pi = 1 is evolutionary stable.
4 Interpretation and Robustness
Information imperfections play a major role in our analysis. We now discuss some
issues of interpretations and robustness associated with our information structure.
In the previous section, the conditional distributions of the private signal xi and of
the individual’s type were identical. In other words, the information gathered through
25Formally, this is represented by the first and second inequality in (25).
26Formally, this is represented by the third inequality in (25).
27If it does not hold the equilibrium would still involve pi = 0, but the level of participation would
be unchanged, since even type O observing x = 0 would participate.
28In the Figure, we assumed φ′ = 0.2 and φ′′ = 0.5. Everything else is as in Figure 1.
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introspection was as accurate as the information generated by the signal. A possible
way to interpret this assumption is that each individual recalls a past event in which
she has been able to observe the type of another individual randomly drawn from the
population. For instance, she might have witnessed the behavior of someone playing
as agent in another trust game.
In reality, adult individuals usually draw inferences from more than one past expe-
rience. The model can be generalized to accommodate individuals observing any finite
number N of (conditionally on pi) independent realizations of x. From a qualitative
viewpoint, our results would not change. Clearly enough, a trustworthy individual
observing N high realizations would expect the agent to be of type T with strictly
higher probability than an opportunist observing the same vector of realizations. As a
result, there exist a set of parameters values such that only a type T observing N high
realizations would participate. This in turn implies that, for parameters values, pi = 1
is evolutionary stable. On the other hand, it is clear that, as N increases, the beliefs
of type T and type O individuals converge. In other words, introspection becomes
less important. Hence, it is legitimate to ask whether, from a quantitative viewpoint,
the effects emerging from our analysis are a reasonable approximation of real world
effects. To a large extent, whether introspection matters for decisions is an empirical
question, and the evidence says that it does. Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2009) show
that not only do ethical attitudes explain trusting behavior, the relationship between
trust and ethical attitudes persists even after principals have had the chance to collect
information on the pool of potential agents.
There are also theoretical reasons to believe that introspection should matter more
than a narrow reading of our analysis may suggest. First, we adopted a stripped down
approach to model the trade off between the temptation to behave opportunistically
and the psychological costs associated with cheating. We just assumed that the costs
were sufficient to prevent opportunistic behavior in type T individuals. In reality, the
temptation to cheat is likely to depend on what is at stake. This implies that the most
informative past experiences for an individual are those in which the stakes were com-
parable to the problem in hand. For instance, I cannot infer from the fact that people
are generally willing to help me when my car gets stuck, that I can entrust most people
with my entire savings. On the other hand, individuals rarely have the possibility to
experiment with high stakes. This suggests that we should expect introspection to
become more relevant as the stakes become higher.
Second, as argued by Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2008), the argument
for the convergence of beliefs relies in part on simplifying assumptions of standard
models of Bayesian learning. If trustworthy and opportunistic disagree on the way
to interpret the information that they gather, asymptotic convergence is not assured.
This implies that introspection may still play a role even when individuals rely upon
an arbitrarily large number of past experiences to take decisions.
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There is also a deeper sense in which simplifying assumptions are relevant for
interpretation. In our simple world, all relevant information about someone’s ethical
attitudes can be inferred from the outcome of the trust game he is playing. The real
world is, of course, much more complicated. The outcomes of economic exchanges
are affected by a large number of factors, besides parties’ ethical attitudes. Observers
typically only have partial information about these factors.29 Hence, the fact that the
information individuals possess is imprecise can be seen as a way to counterbalance
our modelling of economic exchanges as extremely stylized interactions.
We now turn to Assumption 1. Since this is equivalent to assuming that the
conditional variance σ2(x) is positive, Schwarz’s inequality implies that both a) and
b) in Assumption 1 are always satisfied with weak inequality.30 Assumption 1 just
imposes the strict inequality. This is satisfied for a broad class of priors. An example
is the class of Beta distributions (including the uniform (0, 1)). The only counter-
example we could find in which the strict inequality does not hold is the case of a
Bernoulli prior, which attaches positive probability only to pi = 1 and pi = 0. Since we
find this case instructive, we discuss it briefly. The problem with the Bernoulli prior is
that the posterior beliefs of a type T observing x = 0 (or a type O observing x = 1) are
not well defined. This follows from the fact that observing τ = T and x = 0 (or τ = O
and x = 1) is a zero probability event, given the prior. However, even in this extreme
case, our main results would apply if we assumed that individuals use introspection
when presented with zero probability events. In other words, all we need to assume is
that, when the signal x is inconsistent with the individual’s type, she does not believe
that the signal is “more likely” to be correct than her type.31
To conclude, we address the broader issue of the evolutionary approach used in this
paper. Observability of other players’ preferences is generally considered necessary for
unselfish behavior to emerge spontaneously.32 Our rationale for the persistence of
trustworthy behavior does not rely on the observability of other players’ preferences.
29Moreover, people typically lack a full “structural knowledge” of the structure of the game being
played. Kurz (1994) shows that this may generate persistent heterogeneity of beliefs across individ-
uals.
30Schwarz’s inequality ensures that, if x and y are positive valued random variables, E(xy)2 ≤
E(x2)E(y2). Setting x = pi1/2 and y = pi3/2 yields a). Setting x = (1 − pi)1/2 and y = pi(1 − pi)1/2
yields b).
31In other words, the precision of the signal should not go to infinity faster than the precision of
the type.
32When preferences may be observed, Nash behavior may be temporarily destabilized by mutants
who cooperate among themselves and defect with other agents. This is the idea behind the secret
handshake model of Robson (1990). In contrast, when preferences are unobservable, evolutionary
pressures should shape preferences so that individuals would behave “as if” they were playing Nash
in a game in which payoffs represent the individual’s fitness (see for instance Proposition 5 in Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, see also Samuelson, 2001, for a discussion of conceptual problems related
to the observability of preferences).
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In our model, evolution solves the problem of inducing individuals to participate to the
market – when this is optimal – via introspection. By giving people a preference for
trustworthiness, it ensures that they generally trust others. However, evolution may
operate on other dimensions as well. For instance, it could solve the same problem
by giving people a direct preference for trusting others. For trustworthiness to persist
in the long run, it is crucial that individuals are unable to develop “inconsistent”
preferences. For instance, an opportunist with a direct preference for trusting others
could destabilize the equilibrium where pi = 1. Such an individual, however, would
suffer from an irreconcilable conflict between her ethical attitudes/beliefs (“I only care
about my material welfare and believe that most people, at the end of the day, do the
same”) and her trusting preferences (“I think it is unfair to mistrust others”). The
psychology literature on cognitive dissonance suggests that this type of conflicts are
costly for the individual, causing anxiety, stress and other negative emotional states.33
Individuals usually try to reduce conflicts by suppressing dissonant beliefs, attitudes,
or behavior. This implies that the way our cognitive skills evolved may constrain our
ability to develop inconsistent attitudes or to engage in inconsistent behavior.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Our analysis shows that the relationship between ethical attitudes and external in-
centives is quite complex. When external incentives (enforcement) are low, society
may end up in a “bad” equilibrium, where opportunism is rife, and nobody complies.
However, a “good” equilibrium is also possible, where compliance rates are high. In
this good equilibrium, all individuals are trustworthy, and compliance is motivated by
internal norms of conduct, rather than by external incentives.
When external enforcement is high, good ethical attitudes may be “crowded out”.
At equilibrium, compliance is triggered exclusively by the threat of enforcement, and
agents behave opportunistically whenever they can. The “good” equilibrium where
ethical attitudes are trustworthy may no longer be possible. Participation may also
suffer as a result. Hence, our framework provides an example where high external
enforcement may ultimately generate less market participation.
Our crowding out result shares similarities with Bohnet Frey and Huck (2001)
– henceforth BFH. These authors provide experimental evidence that supports the
crowding out hypothesis. However, their theoretical explanation for the result is quite
different from ours. In their model, introspection does not play any role. Rather,
the result emerges because, as enforcement improves, principals are more willing to
trust agents about whom they have unfavorable information. The fact that people
33The theory was formulated by Festinger (1957). Aronson (1979) discusses experimental evidence.
Applications to economics are developed by Akerlof and Dickens (1982).
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possess individual-specific information about their counterparties’ types plays a crucial
role for the result. Here, we show that the crowding out effect also extends to the
case of interactions among strangers. Moreover, in our model crowding out arises
because higher enforcement encourages opportunistic principals to take more chances,
and therefore counteracts the selection effect. The result is thus a consequence of
the differences in the payoffs that different types are able to earn when acting as
principals. By contrast, in BFH the result arises from the payoffs that different types
obtain when acting as agents. The idea is that trustworthy agents are identified as
such by principals, and are therefore trusted more often. In turn, this generates a
direct material advantage for trustworthy agents. In our framework, this potential
source of material advantage for trustworthy agents is ruled out by construction. The
market works under conditions of complete anonymity, and the material payoff of
agents behaving in a trustworthy manner is normalized to zero. Our explanation for
crowding out can therefore be seen as complementary to that proposed by BFH.
A lesson that emerges from our analysis is that measures that are beneficial in the
short-term may not necessarily be beneficial once their long-term effect on preferences
is factored in. A policy that benefits opportunists relatively more than trustworthy
would select in favor of opportunistic attitudes in the long-term. This would reinforce
the very behavior that the policy was set to counteract. In our framework, higher
enforcement may end up doing just that, by encouraging greater participation by
opportunists.
There is a general point here, which actually applies beyond the specifics of the
model at hand. When assessing a policy, standard economic analysis usually con-
centrates on the policy’s effects on the payoffs of different groups in society. Typical
questions asked are: “Who benefits from the policy?” and “Who loses from it?”. If
everyone in society would benefit from a policy, then the policy is generally deemed to
be desirable. As we have seen, however, this approach may no longer be appropriate
once the endogeneity of ethical attitudes is taken into account. In that case, compar-
ing relative gains may become important. The question “Who benefits relatively more
from the policy?” becomes crucial for understanding how the policy may affect the
long-run distribution of ethical attitudes in society. This may for instance be relevant
when considering “bail out” policies that forgive opportunistic behavior in the name
of the common good.
Finally, although we have shown that higher external incentives may in some cases
crowd out good ethical attitudes, crowding in is also possible. This may for instance
occur when the gains that may be reaped from market participation are actually not
very large. In this case, some minimum level of enforcement may be necessary in order
to lure anyone to participate in the market. The presence of some external incentives
may therefore provide the necessary leeway for trustworthy attitudes to spread within
society.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We start with point 2 (b). Given R(φ) ∈ (R1, R2], only type T individuals who observe
x = 1 invest. Hence, XT = {1} and XO = ∅, which implies ∫
x∈XT dG(x|pi) = pi and∫
x∈XO dG(x|pi) = 0. Rearranging the expression for relative fitness (16) one obtains,
Ω(pi;φ) = pi(piθ + (1− pi)φθ − α− piρ(1− φ)) (6.1)
This can be rewritten as
Ω(pi;φ) = piθ(1− φ)
[
pi
θ − ρ
θ
−R(φ)
]
(6.2)
If (θ− ρ)/θ > R(φ), then, for  > 0 vanishing, Ω(1− ;φ) > 0 and Ω(;φ) < 0. Hence,
both pi = 1 and pi = 0 are evolutionary stable. For pi = pˆi ≡ θR(φ)/(θ−ρ), Ω(pi;φ) = 0.
Since the derivative of Ω evaluated at pi = pˆi is positive, pˆi is not evolutionary stable,
but determines the basins of attraction of pi = 1 and pi = 0. Consider now point
2 (a). If R(φ) ∈ (R0, R1], type T invest for both signal realizations {0, 1}. Type
O invest when observing x = 1. Hence, XT = {0, 1} and XO = {1}, which imply∫
x∈XT dG(x|pi) = 1 and
∫
x∈XO dG(x|pi) = pi. From (16),
Ω(pi;φ) = (1− pi)(piθ + (1− pi)φθ − α)− [pi + (1− pi)pi]ρ(1− φ) (6.3)
This can be rewritten as
Ω(pi;φ) = (1− pi)θ(1− φ)
[
pi
θ − ρ
θ
−R(φ)
]
− piρ(1− φ) (6.4)
Notice that, for  small, Ω(1 − ;φ) < 0 and Ω(;φ) < 0, which imply that pi = 0
is evolutionary stable, while pi = 1 is not evolutionary stable. Notice also that in
this case (6.4) is an increasing-decreasing function of pi which takes negative values at
pi = 0 and pi = 1 and has an interior maximum at
piM =
1
2
+
θR(φ)− ρ
2(θ − ρ) (6.5)
Substituting piM in (6.4) shows that, if θ2(1−R(φ))2 > 4θρ− 4ρ2, then there exists a
value pi∗ ∈ (0, 1) of pi such that Ω(pi∗;φ) = 0 and the derivative of Ω evaluated at pi∗
is negative. As a result, pi∗ is evolutionary stable.
Finally, consider point 1. Inspection of (6.2) and (6.4) shows that Ω(pi;φ) is nega-
tive for all pi ∈ [0, 1] when (θ− ρ)/θ ≤ R(φ). Hence, only pi = 0 is evolutionary stable.

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7 Parameters and explanation for figures (material
not meant for publication)
All figures are based on the assumption of uniform prior in (0, 1). This implies
R2 ≡ Π3
Π2
= 0.75, R1 ≡ Π2 − Π3
Π1 − Π2 = 0.5, R0 ≡
Π1 − 2Π2 +Π3
1− 2Π1 +Π2 = 0.25. (7.1)
All figures are based on θ = 1.5 and α = 1 and are generated by changing the values
for ρ and φ.
Figure 1
In this case, ρ = 0.4 and φ = 0.2. This implies R(φ) = 0.583. Hence, R(φ) is between
0.5 and 0.75. As a result, only type T observing x = 1 invest. Hence, the share of
type T who invest is pi and the share of type O who invest is 0. From (16), relative
fitness is
Ω(pi;φ) = piθ(1− φ)
[
pi
θ − ρ
θ
−R(φ)
]
(7.2)
Figure 2
In this case, ρ = 0.8 and φ = 0.2. R(φ) is still between 0.5 and 0.75 so that the
expression for relative fitness is the same as in figure 1.
Figure 3
In this case, ρ = 0.1 and φ = 0.5. Everything else is as in Figure 1. φ = 0.5 now
implies R(φ) = 0.3. Hence, R(φ) is between 0.25 and 0.5. As a result, all type T and
the share of type O observing x = 1. The share of type T who invest is thus 1 and
the share of type O is pi. From (16), relative fitness is
Ω(pi;φ) = (1− pi)θ(1− φ)
[
pi
θ − ρ
θ
−R(φ)
]
− piρ(1− φ) (7.3)
Figure 4
In this case, ρ = 0.4 as in figure 1, φ′ = 0.2 and φ′′ = 0.3. R(φ′) = 0.583 while
R(φ′′) = 0.52381. Both numbers are between 0.5 and 0.75. As a result, the expression
for relative fitness is as in figure 1.
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Figure 5
In this case, ρ = 0.4 as in figure 1, φ′ = 0.2 and φ′′ = 0.5. R(φ′) = 0.583, but
R(φ′′) = 0.3. Hence R(φ′) is between 0.5 and 0.75, so that the expression for relative
fitness is as in figure 1. R(φ′′) is between 0.25 and 0.5 so that the expression for relative
fitness is as in figure 3.
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 Figure 1- Both π = 0 and π = 1 are evolutionary stable 
 
Figure 2 – Only π = 0 is evolutionary stable 
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Figure 3 - π = 0  and π*<1 are evolutionary stable  
 
 
Figure 4 – A higher φ implies a larger basin of attraction of π = 1 
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Figure 5 – Crowding out: a higher φ eliminates the stable equilibrium π = 1  
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